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Christian wisdom holds that "money is the root
of all. . .evil."1 Campaign finance reform propos-
als, then, have historically attempted to protect
the political system from the corrupting influence
of so-called "special interest" money.2 Specifi-
cally, most regulatory approaches attempt to limit
the political impact of the wealth that accumu-
lates in corporate treasuries. 3 Regulatory efforts
assume that a well-funded "special interest" holds
the potential to undermine the legitimacy of
political outcomes. 4 Indeed, ongoing fundraising
1 1 Timothy 6:10 (St. Paul's First Letter to Timothy states,
"Love of money is the root of all kinds of evil").
2 See David Segal, Main Street America Has Advocates
Aplenty: On the Hill, Lobbyists for All WASH. PosT, July 10, 1995,
at Al, for a report regarding the inclusion of every American
in a "special interest." For a deeper examination into the
goals of would-be regulatory reformers, see David A. Strauss,
What is the Goal of Campaign Finance Reform?, 1995 U. CHI
LEGAL F. 141 (1995).
3 Common Cause is the quintessential proponent of reg-
ulatory proposals for political reform. For a perspective on
its long-time president, see Fred Wertheimer and Susan Weiss
Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to Restoring the Health of
OurDemocracy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1126 (1994). For an exami-
nation of Common Cause, which is a nonprofit corporation,
see Robert V. Pambianco, Common Cause's Uncommon Agenda,
CAPITAL RESEARCH CENTER (1993). For a historical overview
of American political finance scandals, see Gil Troy, Money
and Politics: The Oldest Connection, WILSON QUARTERLY, 1997,
at 14-32.
4 See, e.g., James A. Gardner, Protecting The Rationality of
Electoral Outcomes: A Challenge to First Amendment Doctrine, 51 U.
CHI. L. REV. 892 (1984) (arguing that government's interest
in 'rational' outcomes supersedes the citizenry's interest in
free speech). For more on the paternalist perspective guid-
ing the Court's campaign finance jurisprudence, see Daniel
R. Ortiz, The Engaged and the Inert: Theorizing Political Personal-
ity Under the First Amendment, 81 VA. L. REV. 1 (1995). Profes-
sor Ortiz argues that a regulatory approach necessarily pre-
supposes that Americans are (and always will be) unwilling or
unable to meet the requirements of democratic government
absent the Court's careful guidance. See id. at 26-29. Contrast
Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Conse-
quences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049 (1996).
Professor Smith argues that those who advocate equalizing
political power represent a more genuine threat to democ-
racy than does corruption. See id. at 1050.
scandals threaten to overwhelm the nation's high-
est elected officials. 5 As a result, the mass media
have focused on the role of money in politics, 6 a
fact which has appeared to erode public confi-
dence in elected officials. 7 If so, the current regu-
latory regime governing campaign finance bears
closer examination.
8
Although most efforts to reform the system
have focused on closing so-called "loopholes" in
the regulatory regime,9 any changes must pre-
serve First Amendment protection of political de-
5 For an overview of Attorney General Janet Reno's con-
sideration of whether to appoint an Independent Counsel to
address President Bill Clinton's alleged campaign miscon-
duct, see David Johnston, Attorney General Extending Inquiry on
Clinton's Calls, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1997, at Al; Mark Helprin,
Impeach, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 1997, at A22; Micah Morrison,
What Did the President Know When?, WALL ST.J.,July 7, 1997, at
A13. Regarding accusations against Vice President Al Gore;
Bob Woodward, Gore Donors' Funds Used as 'Hard Money,'
WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 1997, at Al.
6 Newspaper columnists representing a range of political
ideologies have harshly criticized the President's fundraising
activities. See, e.g., William Raspberry, Too Crass for Comfort,
WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1997, at A21 (announcing that he is
'bailing out' of support for the Administration).
7 See, e.g., Richard Morin and Dan Balz, President's Ratings
Register a Setback: Fund-raising Controversy Erodes Public Confi-
dence, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 1997, at Al. See also John S.
Shockley, Direct Democracy, Campaign Finance, and the Courts:
Can Corruption, Undue Influence, and Declining Voter Confidence
Be Found?, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 377 (1985). Professor Shock-
ley argues that the proliferation of referenda movements rep-
resents the citizens' distrust of government. See id. at 379-80.
8 This Comment critiques current jurisprudence as well
as many proposals for campaign reform. For a wider range
of perspectives, see the transcript from a May 3, 1996, panel
discussion sponsored by the American Bar Association Sec-
tion on Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice, Election
Law Committee, 13 J. L. & POLITICS 163 (Winter, 1997)
(Trevor Potter, former Commissioner of the Federal Election
Commission, moderated the discussion among University of
Virginia Law Professor Lillian R. BeVier, Common Cause
General Counsel Donald Simon, National Association of
Business PACs Executive Vice President Steven Stockmeyer,
and House Oversight Committee Chairman William Thomas
(R-CA)).
9 See Bradley A. Smith, Why Campaign Finance Reform Never
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bate.' 0 This Comment explores the First Amend-
ment implications of regulatory efforts to limit the
political expression rights of incorporated "spe-
cial interests." Part I reviews existing law gov-
erning campaign finance. Part II surveys pending
proposals to "reform" the system. Part III reveals
flaws in the regulatory approach and points to a
new jurisprudence model. The Comment con-
cludes by proposing a deregulatory approach to
reform that would target actual abuses without
limiting the First Amendment rights of all Ameri-
cans. The proposed jurisprudence model would
protect and foster vigorous political discourse in
the marketplace of ideas.
I. BACKGROUND: PERCEIVED
CORRUPTION AND THE POLITICAL
PROCESS
The proponents of regulatory campaign fi-
nance "reform" argue that corporate treasuries
pose a risk of corrupting political markets. This
Comment momentarily accepts that arguable
premise and surveys the legal theory supporting
regulation of corporate expression.
The Supreme Court has extended "commer-
cial" (or economic) speech protection to corpora-
tions, distinguishing it from political (or edito-
rial) expression that presumably receives greater
protection. 1 The Court has recognized a "socie-
tal right" to receive information that would other-
wise be difficult to obtain.' 2 In such cases, the
Court has emphasized that the "relationship of
speech to the marketplace of products or of serv-
ices does not make it valueless in the marketplace
of ideas."' 3 Recently, a dissenting opinion byJus-
tice Clarence Thomas argued that regulation
should not pass muster when government asserts
an interest in keeping consumers ignorant.' 4 In
Works, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 1997, at A]9. Professor Smith
calls the regulatory proposals "an incumbent's protection
racket" and notes that "some of today's biggest loopholes
were yesterday's reforms." Id. See also Stephen G. Gey, The
Case Against Postmodern Censorship Theory, 145 U. PA. L. REv.
193 (1996). Professor Gey describes and derides efforts by "a
new generation of censors." Id. at 295.
10 See generally Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform:
Specious Arguments, Intractable Dilemmas, 94 COLUM. L. REv.
1258 (1994). For Professor BeVier's initial defense of the
Court's authority to strike down legislative incursions on the
First Amendment, see Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A
Perspective on the First Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform,
73 CALIF. L. REv. 1045 (1985).
' i See N.Y. TIMES Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264
fact, the Court has explicitly recognized a societal
interest in commercial information. 15 Thus, the
Court has identified a societal "right" to informa-
tion as its basis for extending First Amendment
protection to corporate economic expression.
However, the Court extends protection to com-
mercial speech only if it determines that the ex-
pression relates to a legal activity. 16 Furthermore,
government may legitimately regulate commercial
expression if doing so directly advances a substan-
tial state interest through a means "not more ex-
tensive than is necessary to serve that interest.'
' 7
The Court has clarified the last component of this
test by noting that it requires only a reasonable, as
opposed to a perfect, fit between the state's sub-
stantial interest and the means utilized to directly
advance it.18 Importantly, then, legitimate regula-
tion to prevent corporate corruption of economic
markets requires a reasonable effort that directly
advances a substantial state interest. This stan-
dard for upholding limits on societal-based rights
falls somewhat short of the requirement to up-
hold government-imposed limits on individual
rights. Nonetheless, if this test for .preventing
corruption in economic markets must serve as the
bare minimum for regulating corporate political
expression, at what point might the state's interest
in preventing "corruption" of the political process
justify campaign finance regulation?
The Court's antitrust jurisprudence suggests
one possible answer. Antitrust cases provide a
useful context for analyzing modern campaign fi-
nance cases since the Court has prioritized the ba-
sic integrity of and access to the political system in
both kinds of jurisprudence. The Court has re-
fused to find a violation for attempting to influ-
ence legislation, even if such efforts would use the
political process to create an economic monopoly.1 9
Focusing its concern on the establishment of polit-
(1964).
12 See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
13 Id. at 825-826.
14 See 44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S.Ct. 1495
(1996).
15 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976).
16 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
17 Id.
18 See Bd. of Trustees, S.U.N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 479
(1989).
19 See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136 (1961).
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ical monopoly, the Court has refused to limit cor-
porate political expression rights merely because
the exercise of those rights includes lobbying for
the corporation's own "special interest" promo-
tion of economic monopoly. 20 The Court has
held that an antitrust violation, or political cor-
ruption, occurs when excessive corporate influ-
ence amounts to usurpation of the political pro-
cess and essentially denies all access to
competitors. 2 1 Antitrust jurisprudence, then, pro-
vides a touchstone answer to that question com-
mon in corporate political expression cases: at
what point does the threat of corruption become
an interest so compelling that it surpasses political
speech rights? 22 The Court's antitrust cases sug-
gest that government may legitimately regulate
corporate political expression only if the special
interest had so corrupted the political system as to
create a political monopoly that completely shut
out all competing interests.
In its campaign finance cases, the Court directly
examines government regulation of corporate
political participation, but it has frequently failed
to reach results consistent with the standard sug-
gested in the antitrust cases. In U.S. v. Harriss,
2 3
the Court upheld the Federal Regulation of Lob-
bying Act (ROLA) only by narrowly construing its
disclosure requirements. 2 4 The Act would have
compelled solicitors, collectors, or recipients to
disclose any monetary or otherwise valuable aid
contributed in attempts to influence legislative
outcomes. 25 The Court, however, construed the
20 See generally Gary Minda, Interest Groups, Political Free-
dom, and Antitrust: A Modern Reassessment of the Noerr-Pen-
nington Doctrine, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 905 (1990). Professor
Minda argues that the 'Noerr-Pennington doctrine' is flawed
because it assumes pluralistic notions, such as the fact that
interest groups promote social welfare, and because it affords
First Amendment protection to petitioning interest groups.
See id. at 1027.
21 See Cal. Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,
404 U.S. 508, 515 (1972). But see, Robert H. Bork, THE ANTI-
TRUST PARADOX (1978). Judge Bork has articulated the
Court's antitrust approach as focused on identifying preda-
tion through governmental processes. Id. at 347. He also ar-
gues that, as a means to combat political corruption, antitrust
law provides a test involving five prominent factors:
(1) the intent of the parties, (2) the means employed,
(3) the character of the governmental processes in-
volved, (4) the character of the decision to be made; and
(5) the degree to which the process focuses upon the
formulation of general rules or upon the specific rights
or liabilities of particular parties.
Id. at 357.
22 Under a societal-based rights theory, the pivotal ques-
tion is whether the societal interest in preventing corruption
language as unconstitutionally vague unless inter-
preted to define lobbying "in its commonly ac-
cepted sense."26 Thus, the Court limited the Act's
scope to include only activity which as its "princi-
ple" purpose seeks direct communication with a
member of Congress regarding the passage or de-
feat of pending or proposed legislation.
27
In Buckley v. Valeo, 2s the Court examined the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as
amended in 1974 (FECA), which placed monetary
limits on political contributions and expenditures
by candidates for federal elective office. 29 The
Court concluded that regulation of money does,
in fact, regulate speech. 30 The Court upheld con-
tribution limits, reasoning that they "marginally"
interfere with political expression. 31 However,
the Court struck down limits on expenditures,
concluding that they "impose significantly more
severe restrictions on protected freedom of polit-
ical expression." 3
2
The Court has struck down contribution limits
when applied to committees formed to influence
referenda.3 3 Yet, the Court has held that the asso-
ciation interests of individual contributors to a
nonprofit corporation are "overborne" by a Con-
gressional effort to prevent corruption or the ap-
pearance of corruption in the political system.
34
This false distinction between limiting contribu-
tions and limiting expenditures continues to
haunt Congressional debate regarding proposals
to further regulate campaign fundraising. 35
In the aftermath of Buckley, surviving FECA pro-
supersedes the societal interest in allowing corporate expres-
sion. Presumably, the societal rights theory is more open to
regulation by legislation.
23 See generally 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
24 See id. at 620-21.
25 See 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-64, 266-67 & 269 (1988).
26 Hariss, 347 U.S. at 620.
27 See id. at 622.
28 See generally 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
29 Id. See also 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-41 (1988).
30 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19.
31 Id. at 23.
32 Id.
33 Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S.
290, 300 (1981). The Court recognized that such contribu-
tion limits, at least in this limited context, unconstitutionally
infringe on the right of association. See id. For a proposal to
allow limited corporate spending in referenda, see Allen K.
Easley, Buying Back the First Amendment: Regulation of Dispropor-
tionate Corporate Spending in Ballot Issue Campaigns, 17 GA. L.
REv. 675 (1983).
34 FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207
(1982).
35 See Jonathan Rauch, Vote Against McCain, Wait, Can I
19981
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visions force corporations to make political ex-
penditures from a fund segregated for that exclu-
sive purpose. Nonprofit corporations may solicit
only "members" for contributions to these segre-
gated funds, and each for-profit corporation may
solicit only its "restricted class" for contributions
to the to its segregated fund.36 The Court has
held that Congress may require political expendi-
tures to be made from a fund segregated from a
corporation's general treasury where the money
for such expenditures had been derived from so-
called "direct fund-raising. "37 The Court con-
cluded that the mass mail solicitation of persons
lacking either capital stock or a similarly signifi-
cant role in the political committee's accumula-
tion of wealth does not produce revenues repre-
senting a "relatively enduring and independently
significant financial or organizational... member"
analogous to a shareholder in a for-profit corpo-
ration.38
The Court has, however, struck down limits on
expenditures by a similar nonprofit "independent
political committee" precisely because the ex-
penditures were, in fact, contributions to a candi-
date for elective office.3 9 In that case, the Presi-
dential Election Campaign Fund Act had imposed
criminal penalties on independent political com-
mittees that exceeded a limit on contributions to
candidates who had accepted public financing. 4
1
The Court struck down the penalties as applied to
a nonprofit ideological corporation, reasoning
that the sanctions unconstitutionally limited ex-
penditures unrelated to corruption of the polit-
ical system. 41
In each of the cases involving regulation of
political expression by for-profit corporations, the
Court relied on the privileges enjoyed by share-
holders to legitimize legislative efforts to protect
the "integrity" of the political process. Because
society has permitted shareholders to engage in
potentially lucrative investments, the theory
holds, society may regulate expression to limit al-
Say That?, WALL ST. J, Oct. 1, 1997, at A22.
36 See 2 U.S.C. §§ 441b(a), 441(b) (4) (A) and
441(b)(4)(C) (1994).
37 Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. at 204.
38 Id.
39 FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470
U.S. 480 (1985).
40 See 26 U.S.C. § 9012(f) (1994).
41 See Nat' Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at
497.
42 See generally 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978).
leged distortions in the electoral process. Yet, in
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,42 the Court
struck down a Massachusetts effort to ban corpo-
rate political expenditures in referenda not
clearly in the business interest of the specific cor-
poration.4 3 The Court held that in such cases, the
corporation's First Amendment right was not lim-
ited to issues within its business interests. 44 At
least once, then, the Court has disallowed regula-
tion that would merely limit corporate manage-
ment's discretion to exceed the mandate of its
shareholders.
If for-profit corporations enjoy protections be-
yond even their strict business interests, nonprofit
corporations must enjoy as least such levels of pro-
tection. As the Court has examined the First
Amendment political expression rights of non-
profits, it has recognized that the business pur-
pose of such corporations is indeed ideological
rather than economic. In FEC v. Massachusetts Cit-
izensfor Life, Inc.,45 the Court struck down the Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act mandate that corpo-
rations make political expenditures from a
segregated fund where the corporation, a non-
profit ideological association with no for-profit
members or contributors, could not use its incor-
porated status to accumulate wealth and manipu-
late the political process beyond any reflection of
actual public support.46 Here again, the Court
found room for further distinctions and maneu-
vering.
In Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Com-
merce,47 restrictions on a nonprofit corporation's
political expression survived scrutiny as a means
of limiting the political influence of its "for-profit
corporate members."4 The Court upheld a "seg-
regated fund" requirement as narrowly tailored to
a compelling state interest in preventing the cor-
ruption at the hands of "huge corporate treasur-
ies" amassed with the aid of favorable state laws. 49
Even under strict scrutiny, the Court upheld the
inapplicability of a statute regarding unincorpo-
43 See id.
44 Id.
45 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
46 Id. at 259.
47 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
48 ld. at 657-660. See, e.g., Gerald G. Ashdown, Controlling
Campaign Spending and the 'New Corruption': Waiting for the
Court, 44 VAND. L. REV. 767 (1991) (examining the Court's
apparent focus on limiting this 'new corruption').
401 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 668, 669.
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rated labor unions, relying upon Beck50 to note
that union members were entitled to refrain from
contributing to funds used for political pur-
poses.5 1 The Court distinguished this case from
FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., reasoning
that the Chamber's non-political, non-business ac-
tivities created a disincentive for for-profit corpo-
rations to end their affiliation (and the provision
of dues) even if they disagreed with the Cham-
ber's political advocacy. 52 The Chamber's poten-
tial for influence by for-profit corporations
seemed significant to the Court.5 3 In a scathing
dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the constitution
does not entrust to majoritarian government deci-
sions as to who may, in fairness, speak and who
may not.54 Scalia noted that corporations are, in
fact, voluntary associations; 55 that no amount of
special treatment under the law should deprive an
individual or association of constitutional protec-
tion;56 and that the majority has restricted corpo-
rate expression in ways that would not pass consti-
tutional muster if applied to individuals.5
7
Finally, many of the current proposals for cam-
paign finance reform must consider the existing
jurisprudence governing disclosure rules. As in
Harriss, the Buckley Court upheld disclosure and
record keeping provisions.58 Still, the Court has
struck down such requirements, with respect to
both contributions and expenditures, as applied
to a minor political party that had been histori-
cally harassed. 59 Thus, the Court has demon-
strated at least a distaste for mandatory disclosure.
Importantly, the Court has struck down regula-
tion that would compel political expression by un-
willing participants. The Court has also held that
a state may not mandate the display of an ideolog-
50 See Communication Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735
(1988).
51 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 665. For an extensive treatment
of underinclusiveness as an argument against regulatory pro-
posals which restrain for-profit corporations, as opposed to
the relatively unrestrained political activities of labor unions,
see William E. Lee, The First Amendment Doctrine of Under-
breadth, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1993).
52 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 662-63.
53 See id.
54 See id. at 680.
55 See id.
56 See id. at 681.
57 See id. at 685. For an extensive critique of Austin in
light of the Court's previous decisions governing corporate
political expression, seeJill E. Fisch, Frankenstein's Monster Hits
the Campaign Trail: An approach to Regulation of Corporate Polit-
ical Expenditures, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 587 (1991).
ical theme on its citizens' automobile license
plates60 and that it may not require a corporation
to carry political opponents' messages on "extra
space" on billing statements.6 1 Although the
Court has implied a right of public access to pri-
vate property, (in essence, compelling the prop-
erty owner to sponsor the expression) where the
property owner had opened the property to the
public and could easily disclaim sponsorship of
the particular viewpoint, 62 the Court has also in-
sisted that this "does not undercut the proposi-
tion that forced associations that burden pro-
tected speech are impermissible. ' 6 3 For example,
the Court has upheld the right of parade or-
ganizers to exclude proponents of political views
with which they disagree, even though the parade
took place not only in a public forum, as in
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, but on public
property.64 In Communication Workers v. Beck, the
Court limited the ability of labor union managers
to unilaterally use members' dues in pursuit of a
political agenda (or for any purpose beyond the
authority to conduct collective bargaining) .65
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: CRACKS IN
THE COURTS CONSENSUS, EFFORTS
TO FURTHER REGULATE, AND A
PROPOSAL TO UNDO THE DAMAGE
The Court has yet to reject the Buckley model,
provoking dissatisfaction and eroding public con-
fidence in elected officials. But most recently, the
Court lost a majority of support behind any partic-
ular analytical model.6 6 Justice Thomas actually
rejected the current jurisprudence and called for
the application of strict scrutiny to all campaign
58 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 84.
59 See Brown v. Socialist Workers, 459 U.S. 87, 101
(1982).
60 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977).
61 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n,
475 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1986).
62 See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74,
87-88 (1980).
63 Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 12.
64 See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual
Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
65 Beck, 487 U.S. at 762-63 (1988).
66 See Colorado Republican Federal Election Campaign
Committee v. FEC, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996). For more on the
ramifications of this case, see Richard Briffault, Campaign Fi-
nance, the Parties and the Court: A Comment on Colorado Republi-
can Federal Election Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Com-
mission, 14 CONST. COMMENTARY 91 (1997).
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finance regulation. In light of the Court's lack of
consensus, this Comment proposes an alternative
jurisprudence and some limits on corporate polit-
ical expression that would survive even Justice
Thomas' test.
This Comment, then, explores the legislative re-
forms proposed during the last year. Ironically,
even amid efforts to deregulate communications
media, proposals for political reform-which in-
volve the substance of a healthy democracy's com-
munications-continue to adopt regulatory ap-
proaches to campaign fundraising reform.
Congressional efforts have focused on a bill spon-
sored by Senators John McCain (R-AZ) and Rus-
sell Feingold (D-WI). 6 7 As originally introduced,
the McCain-Feingold bill would have limited fi-
nancial contributions to political parties and com-
pelled the broadcast networks to grant "free time"
to federal candidates for elective office.6 8 The
current version of McCain-Feingold dropped
these most controversial provisions and retained
the core of the bill, a ban on so-called "soft
money" contributions to political parties. 69 Sen-
ate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MI) has at-
tempted to add a labor-oriented amendment to
this bill that would make McCain-Feingold subject
to a filibuster by Democrats.7 0 His amendment
would go beyond the codification of Beck to limit
the unions' ability to spend members' dues with-
out the prior express permission of the mem-
bers.71 The bill would require said permission to
be expressly provided by union members each
year.72 The primary opponent to McCain-Fein-
gold remains Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY),
who argues that each of these measures would vio-
late the First Amendment.
73
Constitutional concerns have only served as a
speed bump for would-be speech regulators on
the road to "reform". House Minority Leader
67 See CONG. REC. S9994 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1997) (state-
ment of Sen. Lott).
68 S. 25, 105th Cong. (1997).
69 John Harwood, How McCain-Feingold Would Alter Cam-
paign Finance, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 1997, at A24.
70 See David Rogers, Senate GOP Impedes Campaign Bill By
Demanding Vote on Union Dues Plan, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30,
1997, at A24.
71 See id. See also, e.g., S. 9, 105th Cong. (1997).
72 See Rogers, supra note 70, at A24.
73 CONG. REC. S10010 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1997) (state-
ment of Sen. McConnell).
74 Gephardt introduced H.R. 47, 105th Cong. (1997).
Congressmen John Dingell (D-MI), Eliot Engel (D-N.Y.), and
Marcy Kaptur (D-OH), respectively, introduced H.R. 9, 105th
Richard Gephardt (D-MO) and three other Con-
gressmen introduced measures to amend the
Constitution to allow restrictions on campaign
fundraising.74 Gephardt's Amendment would
have carved an exception in the First Amendment
to allow "reasonable regulations" on campaign fi-
nance reform. 75 A variation on Gephardt's reso-
lution was introduced in the upper house by Sen-
ator Fritz Hollings (D-SC) .76 After a spirited
debate over several days, the measure failed by a
surprisingly close margin: 38 in favor and 61 op-
posed.
77
These renewed efforts to change the current
rules regarding campaign fundraising follow a pe-
riod of intense scrutiny regarding recent scandals
involving the 1996 elections. Soon after they ac-
quired control of Congress in January of 1995,
Republicans had issued not-so-veiled threats to
for-profit corporations' nonprofit Political Action
Committees that had heretofore funded both par-
ties: cut off the other side, or your donations buy
you nothing.7
8
Democrats have also alleged that Republicans
used nonprofit corporations to circumvent cam-
paign finance regulations. First, they charged
that House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA) had
improperly used a nonfederal political committee
to fuel his political agenda and to seize control of
the House. 79 More recently, critics claimed that
former Republican National Committee Chair-
man Haley Barbour had used a nonprofit corpo-
ration, the National Policy Forum, to funnel
money into Republican candidates' operations.
Recently, however, Democrats have endured
numerous scandals regarding various efforts to
peddle presidential access to for-profit corpora-
tions.8 0 Initial outrage focused on an underlying
fundraising purpose to the Clinton Administra-
Cong. (1997); H.R. 14, 105th Cong. (1997); and H.R. 17,
105th Cong. (1997).
75 H.R. 47, 105th Cong. (1997).
76 See S. 18, 105th Cong. (1997).
77 See CONG. REC. S2397 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1997) (roll
call vote).
78 See Ken Auletta, Pay Per Views, NEW YORKER, June 5,
1995, at 52-56. See also Thomas B. Edsall, Capital Drama: As
the PACs Turn, WAsH. POsT, July 23, 1995, at A8. See also He-
lene Cooper, GOP to Rebuke Companies for Bipartisan Donations,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 1997, at A14.
79 See Leslie Lenkowsky, Newt Tax Violation Hard to Find,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 1997, at A8.
80 See Phil Kuntz, Hearings Unveil Reckless Pursuit of Specials
Interests, WALL ST. J., July 28, 1997, at A20.
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tion's White House "coffees" with the president 8'
and overnight stays in the Lincoln bedroom.
8 2
Congressional hearings uncovered evidence of co-
ordination between Democratic National Com-
mittee and White House operations to bring "soft
money" into the 1996 Clinton campaign, 83 as well
as testimony indicating that Administration policy
was influenced by contributors, irrespective of
character.8 4  Evidence also suggests that the
Teamsters and their parent labor union, the AFL-
CIO, conspired with the Democratic National
Committee in a White House-coordinated effort
to funnel labor union PAC contributions, as well
as government money intended to monitor the
Teamster's internal elections, into the 1996 presi-
dential and congressional campaigns. 85 Most re-
cently, videotapes have revealed the President at
ease interacting with potential contributors at the
White House. 86 Along with a general failure by
81 Charles Babcock, Clinton White House Was Host to 58
More Political Functions: Number of Events for Supporters Much
Greater Than First Disclosed, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 1997, at A21.
82 See Kenneth T. Walsh, Bedtime Stories, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Mar. 10, 1997, at 24-26. For a list of the White
House overnight guests, see White House Guests, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 25, 1997, Interactive Ed. <http://www.wsj.com>. See also
The Lincoln Bedroom Caper, WEEKLY STANDARD, Mar. 10, 1997,
at 11. See generally Glenn R. Simpson and Michael K. Frisby,
White House Files Depict Fund Raising, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26,
1997, at A18; Phil Kuntz,, Working the Room' Takes On New
Meaning for Fund-Raisers Greeting White House Visitors, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 27, 1997, at 18.
83 See Roberto Suro, Clinton Campaign Directed 'Soft
Money, 'Panetta Says, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1997, at A4. But see
Geoffrey M. Wardle, Time to Develop a Post-Buckley Approach to
Regulating the Contributions and Expenditures of Political Parties:
Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Cam-
paign Committee, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 603 (1996).
84 See Michael K. Frisby and David Rogers, Businessman's
Access to White House Leads to a Security Inquiry, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 17, 1997, at Al; CIA Memos Detail DNC Chiefs Contacts on
Behalf of Executive, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 1997, Interactive Ed.
<http://www.wsj.com>; See generally David S. Broder, The
Price of 'Access, 'WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1997, at C7.
85 See Glenn Simpson, Union Probe Studies Ties to Clinton,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 1997, at A16. See also Frank Swoboda
and Sharon Walsh, U.S. Says Carey Aides Used DNC, AFL-CIO,
WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1997, at Al; Marianne Lavelle, When
Do-Gooders Get Into Bad Trouble: The Teamster Connection at Citi-
zen Action, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 13, 1997, at 33; E.J.
Dionne, Jr., The Teamster Mess, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1997, at
A19; and Sharon Walsh, Teamster Race Became a Dealmaker's
Undoing, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1997, at Al.
86 See generally Giovanna Rossi, Tribes Deal Themselves In:
Indian Gaming Money and Political Influence, POLICY.COM, (vis-
ited Nov. 1997), <http://www.policy.com> (regarding an al-
leged 'shakedown' of American Indians resulting in a serious
form of 'corruption'-coercion). See generally David A.
Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 1369 (1994) (arguing that coercion repre-
the Clinton Administration to be forthcoming,87
these types of scandals have inspired the introduc-
tion of two separate bills in the House of Repre-
sentatives; each would make fundraising on fed-
eral property expressly illegal.88 Coupled with
allegations that the Vice President conducted
"hard money" fundraising on federal property,89
Congressional Republicans asked the Attorney
General to begin an Independent Counsel investi-
gation.90 Her reluctance to do so has provoked
the introduction of legislation to compel her to
act.91
Most seriously in the eyes of the public,92 FBI
investigators uncovered illegal foreign contribu-
tions9" of so-called "soft money" to the Demo-
cratic National Committee. 9 4 This prompted the
introduction of three additional bills from Con-
gress proposing to make such contributions ex-
pressly illegal.
95
sents the only corruption that government may legitimately
act to prevent).
87 See William Clinger, A Pattern of Stonewalling WALL ST.
J., May 1, 1997, Interactive Ed., <http://www.wsi.com>. See
also David E. Rosenbaum, Witness Says Clinton Aide Asked Him
to Shred a Fax, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1997, at A8; John Solo-
mon, White House Admits Discovering False Testimony Two Years
Ago, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 1997, Interactive Ed. <http://
www.wsj.com>; Richard Cohen, Was that Hush Money?, WASH.
POST, Apr. 8, 1997, at A15.
88 See H.R. 636, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 2073, 105th
Cong. (1997).
89 Larry Margasak, Gore Made 44 Fund-Raising Calls From
Office: Memos Show Aides Tried to Block Out Time for Vice Presi-
dent's Efforts, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 1997, at A4; Transcript of
Vice President Gore's News Conference on Campaign Fund-Raising,
WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 1997, at A9.
90 Byron York, UnequalJustice, WEEKLY STANDARD, Oct. 13,
1997, at 27. See also The Disgrace of Janet Reno, WEEKLY STAN-
DARD, Oct. 20, 1997, at 11; Bankruptcy of Justice, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 4, 1997, at A10,; Troubled Justice, WALL ST. J., July 31,
1997, at A18.
91 See S. 1065, 105th Cong, (1997); S. 22, 105th Cong.
(1997).
92 See Morin and Balz, supra note 7, at 101.
93 See Brian Duffy and Bob Woodward, Senate Panel Is
Briefed on China Probe Figure, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1997, at
Al. See generally Bruce D. Brown, Alien Donors: The Participa-
tion of Non-Citizens in the U.S. Campaign Finance System, 15YALE
L. & POL'Y REv. 503 (1997) (for an overview of the regula-
tions governing foreign influence).
94 Hilary Stout and John Harwood, Foreign Political Dona-
tions Worry Public, Poll Finds, WALL ST.J., Mar. 12, 1997, Inter-
active Ed. <http://www.wsj.com>. See also Barbara Vobejda,
Freeh Discloses Significant Expansion of Campaign Finance Investi-
gation, WASH. POST, May 5, 1997, at A2; Lena Sun, Tracing
Lippo Empire's Campaign Links, WASH. POST, May 7, 1997,
WashingtonPost.com, <http://www.washingtonpost.com>.
95 See H.R. 34, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 354, 105th
Cong. (1997); S. 1190, 105th Cong. (1997). Some proposals
would even restrict contributions from all sources outside of
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Some bills proposed in Congress during 1997
attempt to ban or otherwise restrict contributions
by PACs96 and/or "soft money" contributions to
political parties.' 7 Many of the bills attempt to re-
strict expenditures, either via the mandates out-
lawed by Buckley or through public financing en-
ticements. 98 Other proposals would strengthen
disclosure rules991 or set up commissions to fur-
ther study the issue.11°
While Congressional enactment of any legisla-
tion affecting campaign fundraising remains un-
likely,"" would-be speech regulators have suc-
ceeded in forcing an agreement to allow floor
amendments and a vote on the McCain-Feingold
bill by March.1
1 2
Opponents of further campaign finance restric-
tions reportedly plan to introduce an alternative
bill that might eliminate limits and require disclo-
sure. 1 3 Congressman John Doolittle (R-CA) has
already offered a novel plan to eliminate contribu-
tion limits entirely and to replace the complex
regulatory scheme with a simple "full and immedi-
ate disclosure" requirement. 0 4 This approach
would take full advantage of online technology
and rely on press attention and public scrutiny to
police the "corrosive" influence of money in poli-
tics. As the ensuing analysis will reveal, the Doolit-
tle approach and a First Amendment jurispru-
dence that recognizes corporations as associated
individuals offers much promise for robust polit-
ical discourse.
III. ANALYSIS: FLAWS IN THE OLD REGIME
AND IN PENDING PROPOSALS
This Comment has surveyed the sometimes in-
spired but frequently flawed law that governs cor-
porate political expression. A Comment tradition-
ally analyzes the most recent developments in a given
field of law, and this Comment has surveyed re-
form proposals offered in the last year. But this
the member's district. See, e.g., H.R. 2573, 105th Cong. (1997).
96 See, e.g., H.R. 243, 105th Cong. (1997).
97 See, e.g., H.R. 2183, 105th Cong. (1997). See generally
Clarisa Long, Shouting Down the Voice of the People: Political Par-
ties, Powerful PACs, and Concerns About Corruption, 46 STAN. L.
REv. 1161 (1994); KirkJ. Nahra, Political Parties and the Cam-
paign Finance Laws: Dilemmas, Concerns and Opportunities, 56
FORDHAM L. REV. 53 (1987).
98 See, e.g., H.R. 600, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 243,
105th Cong. (1997). See also Daniel Hays Lowenstein,
Frameworks of Analysis and Proposals for Reform: A Symposium on
Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil Is Deeply Rooted,
particular Comment is motivated by the relative
inaction in this field in the face of eroding public
confidence in elected officials. In short, this
Comment argues that the precedent is just in-
spired enough to prevent the kinds of reform be-
ing sought yet flawed enough to prevent any
other, more targeted reform, as well. Given the
Court's lack of consensus behind its current ana-
lytical framework, this Comment proposes a new
jurisprudence to govern corporate political ex-
pression.
This Comment, then, critiques the current law
and reform proposals in the context of a pro-
posed replacement model for corporate First
Amendment jurisprudence. The proposed model
will simultaneously preserve vital first amendment
freedoms and promote public confidence in the
integrity of the political system. First, this analysis
will ascertain whether First Amendment political
expression rights reside in individuals or in soci-
ety. Second, it will explore the nature of a corpo-
ration to determine whether it is a voluntary asso-
ciation of individuals or a socially-endowed legal
fiction. Third, this critique will ascertain whether
the law distinguishes between legitimate expres-
sion on behalf of an incorporated association and
political expression beyond the scope of manage-
ment's authority. Finally, this analysis will ex-
amine the degrees to which for-profit and non-
profit corporations may legitimately engage in
protected political expression. The analysis will
conclude that the federal government holds no
authority with which to regulate political markets.
Accordingly, the Comment will propose a new
campaign finance jurisprudence that would per-
mit only the targeted reforms within the limited
scope of state and federal authority.
A. Individual Rights and Societal Interests
A proper analysis of the First Amendment's ap-
18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 301 (1989) (for an argument favoring
public financing as an answer to political corruption).
99 See, e.g., H.R. 2074, 105th Cong. (1997).
100 See, e.g., H.R. 1614, 105th Cong. (1997).
1(' See Evans-Novak Political Report, Oct. 28, 1997, at 1.
102 See Senate Leaders Come to an Agreement on Reform Im-
passe, CONG. DAILY, Oct. 30, 1997, at 1; Helen Dewar, March
Deadline Set for Senate Campaign Finance Bill, WASH. POST, Oct.
31, 1997, at A4.
")- See Paxon and Shaw Work on GOP Campaign Finance Re-
form Bill, THE WHITE House BULL., Oct. 30, 1997, at 4.
104 See, e.g., H.R. 965, 105th Cong. (1997).
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plicability to corporations must begin by examin-
ing the nature of First Amendment freedoms.
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech ... or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances."'10 5 Thus, the rights to
peaceful assembly and to petition are expressly re-
served to "the people," and the clear language of
the text prohibits Congress from limiting "free-
dom of speech."'10 6 But were the framers of our
social compact referring to people as mere indi-
viduals or as components of something greater?10 7
The framers of the constitution were heavily in-
fluenced by natural law theory, born of the
Judeau-Christian theological tradition, in which
humans are freely and rationally created in the
image of a free and rational Creator.'08 Jefferson
declared as "self-evident" the idea that "all men
are created equal and endowed by their Creator
with inalienable rights". 10 9 Separately, Jefferson
argued that "the God who gave us life gave us lib-
erty at the same time."' 10 Thus, those who fought
for independence from England did so to pre-
serve the inalienable rights that were the birth-
right of not only all British Americans, but of all
persons. History records no evidence to suggest
that any person ever died for the independence
and rights of a corporation. Those first Ameri-
cans achieved independence and framed a social
contract to protect the individual rights of their
descendants.
Among these rights "inalienable" from the indi-
vidual, the rights to voluntary assembly, petition,
and political speech are presumably at the top of
the hierarchy. 11' As Thomas Paine argued,
"Speech is, in the first place, one of the natural
rights of man always retained."' 1 2 Paine further
105 U.S. Const. amend. I.
106 Id.
107 See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law
System: The Role of the United States Federal Courts in Interpreting
the Constitution and Laws, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FED-
ERAL COURTS AND THE LAw, 37-41, PRINCETON UNIV. PRESS
(1997) (Amy Gutmann, ed.) (arguing the importance of an
'original understanding' of the First Amendment); "To guar-
antee that the freedom of speech will be no less than it is
today is to guarantee something permanent; to guarantee
that it will be no less than the aspirations of the future is to
guarantee nothing in particular at all." Id. at 135-36.
108 See Genesis 1:27.
109 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, Preamble (U.S.
1776).
1 10 Thomas Jefferson, Summary View of the Rights of British
elaborated that "the unrestrained communication
of thoughts and opinions being one of the most
precious rights of man, every citizen may speak,
write, and publish freely, provided he is responsi-
ble for the abuse of this liberty in cases deter-
mined by the law."' "13 Traditional understanding,
then, holds that the first amendment applies only
to individuals."l 4 Jefferson even more plainly de-
scribed his own "Summary View of the Rights of
British America" as "laid out before his majesty,
with that freedom of language and sentiment
which becomes a free people claiming their rights,
as derived from the laws of nature, and not as the gift
from their chief magistrate".1 15 Thus, the framers ex-
plicitly rejected notions of rights as held by
groups or society, and they rejected in particular
the idea of the state as a source of rights.
As this Comment has demonstrated, the com-
mercial speech doctrine was the initial basis for
recognizing First Amendment rights held by cor-
porations, but this jurisprudence model began by
attributing corporate economic expression rights
to the societal interest in obtaining informa-
tion.' 16 The Court has opened the door to unlim-
ited restrictions on corporate expression by iden-
tifying societal interest as the authority protecting
the "marketplace of ideas" from government reg-
ulation. " 17 Central Hudson, after all, recognized a
societal interest as the source of authority to regu-
late this same "marketplace of ideas"."" Thus, by
establishing a societal interest as authority for
both regulation of and freedom from restrictions
on expression, current precedent regarding cor-
porate expression places all of the power in
majoritarian hands. A legislature receives much
more latitude to regulate expression borne of a
"societal interest" than it does when an "individ-
America, WRITINGS 122.
I1 T. Barton Carter, Juliet Lushbough Dee, Martin J.
Gaynes, and Harvey L. Zuckman, MASS COMMUNICATIONS
LAW IN A NUTSHELL 5-7 (1994).
112 Thomas Paine, Rights of Man: Declaration of the Rights
of Man and of Citizens, COLLECTED WRITINGS 486 (Library of
America, New York, N.Y., 1995).
113 Id. at 507.
114 See Christina E. Wells, Reinvigorating Autonomy: Free-
dom and Responsibility in the Supreme Court's First Amendment Ju-
risprudence, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159 (Winter, 1997).
115 Thomas Jefferson, WRITINGS at 120-21 (emphasis ad-
ded).
116 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.




ual right" draws lines that government may cross
only under the strictest of scrutiny.
Sullivan distinguished commercial speech and
afforded greater protection to political expres-
sion, but the Court's societal-based rights theory
in its commercial speech cases opened the door
to restrictions on political expression intolerable
in the commercial sphere. No laws restrict the
amount of money spent on Super Bowl advertising
via restrictions on contributions to companies.
For example, consumers finance economic adver-
tising via their purchases of products. But the
Court has upheld limits on political advertising via
limits on contributions to candidates. Thus indi-
viduals (including those assembled in a corpora-
tion) are limited in the degree to which they may
"purchase" political ideas. The societal-based no-
tion of rights produced this legacy. Rights de-
rived from society ultimately empower society's
representative in the political world, government,
at the expense of individuals. In each of the pri-
mary precedents regarding campaign finance, the
Supreme Court fails to reconcile the conflict be-
tween First Amendment theories that invest rights
in individuals and those that attribute rights to so-
ciety. Resolution of this first question is intrinsi-
cally important as it relates to ramifications of the
answer to the second fundamental question: what
is a corporation?
B. Incorporated Associations or Fictional
Entities?
An analysis of the first amendment political ex-
pression rights of corporations must next deter-
mine whether corporations exist as associations of
individuals with rights or as mere state-sanctioned
legal fictitious which enjoy only revocable privi-
leges.
The English Common Law and American tradi-
tion has long assigned the phrase "legal fiction" to
the corporation.1 19 As merely a government-
sponsored fictitious entity, the corporation's
existence is subject to both government restraint
and whatever affirmative "public interest" obliga-
119 See generally Henry Butler, The Contractual Theory of the
Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON L. Rhv. 99, 100-123 (1989).
120 See generally David R. Lagasse, Undue Influence: Corpo-
rate Political Speech, Power and the Initiative Process, 61 BROOK. L.
REV. 1347 (1995).
121 Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 284-85 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring
tions that society chooses to impose. The corpo-
ration continues to enjoy limited liability and
other privileges, due to state-sponsorship, and so-
ciety benefits from the resulting economic growth
and accumulation of capital. To the degree that
the accumulation of capital begins to threaten the
appearance of corruption or undue influence,
this theory allows for unlimited regulation.
120
The courts, however, have chosen to selectively
award the corporation with certain "rights" under
the constitution. 1
21
Massachusetts' ban on expenditures in Bellotti is
consistent with the most noble parts of Buckley
since the limits only applied where the political
issue exceeded the scope of management's fiduci-
ary duty. However, the narrow holding of Bellotti
ignores the fact that rights and the nature of cor-
porations are vested in individuals, not managers
representing a "legal fiction" and not in society's
"right" to hear all views. Massachusetts had merely
attempted to subject corporate management to
limits on discretion over the money of others
(shareholders and members). Whereas the Bellotti
court relied upon the intent of the framers of the
First Amendment, the proposed jurisprudence
model would rely upon the textual meaning of the
First Amendment 22 The Bellotti court failed to
recognize that the Constitution protects an indi-
vidual's right to express an opinion rather than
society's right to hear it. It further failed to distin-
guish between the narrow limits on manage-
ment's discretion that Massachusetts had sought to
enact and the broader Buckley-type limits on polit-
ical expression.
As the previous analysis concluded by noting
that rights are properly attributed to individuals,
this analysis arrives at a similar conclusion regard-
ing the nature of corporations. The "legal fic-
tion" theory assigns rights to an actor that, by defi-
nition, cannot act except through its agents and
employees. The corporation does not speak; its
managers purchase commercial time, and author-
ize a message to convince individuals ,to purchase
the products that the individuals who invested in
the corporation believed could be sold. "Being
in art and dissenting part). See also Carl J. Mayer, PERSONAL,
IZING THE IMPERSONAL: CORPORATIONS AND THE BILL OF
RIGHTS, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577 (1990) (for an argument that
the recognition of Bill of Rights protections for corporations
represents a return to substantive due process as a shield to
regulation).
122 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776.
[Vol. 6
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
the mere creature of law, [the corporation] pos-
sesses only those properties which the charter of
creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as in-
cidental to its very existence."1 23 Any intervention
in the activities of a "legal fiction" might be justi-
fied by sufficient state interest. The question then
becomes whether an alternative legal theory views
corporations as voluntary associations of individu-
als?
The "Law and Economics" school of thought
defines the corporation as a "nexus of con-
tracts". 1 24 Under this theory, investors (share-
holders) contract with professional managers (of-
ficers), and the corporation contracts with the
state via the corporate charter. According to this
view, the corporate legal status is an incentive for
the pooling of capital because shareholders are
subject to limited liability. This, in turn, produces
economic growth through increased investment,
production, and employment. Management
serves at the discretion of the owners and must
honor a contractual fiduciary duty to represent
their interests. By this view, individuals are the ac-
tors, the corporation is a vehicle for investment
and profit, and the first amendment political ex-
pression rights of managers are derived solely
from those of the shareholders. The shareholders
are the individuals whose rights the Constitution
was written to protect. If corporations exist as a
nexus of contracts between individual investors,
between the associated investors and managers,
and between the associated investor/managers
and the state, traditional theories protect these
contractual relationships, civil liability extends to
limit their first amendment conduct, and the con-
stitution continues to limit the ability of govern-
ment to restrain first amendment expression.
Thus, in Bellotti, Massachusetts had only sought
to do by statute what the courts have generally
failed to mandate through traditional breach of
fiduciary duty derivative actions. By the language
of the Massachusetts statute and under the model
jurisprudence outlined throughout this analysis,
the corporation's managers should be required to
justify their expenditures under the authority
granted them under contract. If a corporation is
123 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S.
518, 636 (1819).
124 ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS 12-13 (1994).
125 See, e.g., Adam P. Hall, Regulating Corporate 'Speech' in
Public Elections, 39 CASE W. REs. L. Rrv. 1313 (1989). Hall
a nexus of contracts, the corporation has con-
tracted with the state and is subject to those terms,
as well as the fiduciary interest terms implicated
by the contract between managers and sharehold-
ers. If those interests are primarily economic, as is
the case in for-profit corporations, the corpora-
tion's managers should be required to offer a rea-
sonable valid for-profit goal furthered by the ex-
penditure or suffer a breach of fiduciary duty
verdict. Nonprofit ideological corporations
would afford managers much more latitude under
this model, since the primary purpose of such a
corporation is not to make money. Under this
scheme, then, a for-profit corporation would be
limited to expenditures reasonably justifiable re-
garding the commercial purpose of the associa-
tion. This would undoubtedly make valid the ex-
pression of nearly all commercial speech, as well
as any political speech that could be reasonably
justified in the context of Noerr-type advocacy. Of
course, Trucking Unlimited -antitrust liability would
continue to protect the integrity of the political
process from excessive participation in the (or
usurpation of the) political process.
In Massachusetts Citizens for Life and in Justice
Scalia's dissent in Austin v. Chamber of Commerce,
corporations are treated as voluntary associations
of individuals. This view logically produces first
amendment political expression rights for the
corporation, either as a conduit for the "free
speech" of individual shareholders or as a peace-
ful assembly or petitioning group of the same. If
corporate political expression rights are a product
of the corporation's nature as a voluntary associa-
tion of individuals, then "society's interest" in lim-
iting corporate participation in political debate is
subject to limits. ' 25 The Courts would hold legis-
latures to a "least restrictive means" test, a stan-
dard which would defeat most broad regulatory
mandates.
C. Corporate Executives and the Abuse of
Discretion
This analysis has attributed to individuals the
nature of both "rights" and "corporations"; only
argues that viewing the corporation as an association neces-
sarily alters the First Amendment analysis of campaign fi-
nance regulation, although certain current regulatory ap-
proaches would survive if the corporation in question had
insufficiently acted to amplify members' views. Id. at 1339-40.
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individuals enjoy rights, and corporations only ex-
ist as voluntary associations of individuals. There-
fore, the true distinction between corporate and
individual expression lies in the need for an actor
on behalf of the corporation. Corporations do
not "do" anything; they require managers and em-
ployees. Shareholders elect a leadership to repre-
sent the interests of the corporation, a voluntarily
associated group of individuals who share a pur-
pose, either profitable or nonprofit. Corporate
managers, then, represent their shareholders (if
for-profit) or members (if nonprofit). This is
their fiduciary duty, enforceable via civil derivative
action.1
2 6
However, the courts have afforded corporate of-
ficers increasingly wide latitude under the Busi-
ness Judgment Rule. 127 As funding sources for
"politically correct" causes, 1 28 corporation manag-
ers are encouraged to "invest" shareholders'
money in "socially responsible" ways.129 It is ironic
that this politically biased vision has produced a
theory under which the right of for-profit corpo-
rations has been curtailed to prevent political cor-
ruption while nonprofit charitable corporations,
ostensibly formed to perform services for individ-
uals in need, have been encouraged to enter into
the political process.' 30 The political arena has
witnessed a proliferation of such nonprofit politi-
cally ideological corporations.' 3 ' To the extent
that more and more nonprofits have focused on
pushing a political agenda, less money is available
to the traditional charities that provide services di-
rectly to those in need. In practice, then, corpo-
126 See Edward D. Rogers, Striking the Wrong Balance: Con-
stituency Statutes and Corporate Governance, 21 PEPP. L. REv. 777
(1994). Professor Rogers discusses corporate executives' ef-
forts to win more discretionary power via so-called "constitu-
ency statutes," and concludes that such efforts decrease ac-
countability and increase management's power, thereby
making a bad situation worse for shareholders. Id. at 811.
127 See Hamilton, supra note 124, at 735-821.
128 See generally Alexis de Tocqueville, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA (Richard D. Heffner, ed., 1956). Tocqueville's de-
scription of "tyranny of the majority" feared the development
of a stifling consensus in which public opinion chilled con-
troversial expression, but even Tocqueville did not predict
that the consensus could be imposed by an elite minority. Id.
at 117-19.
129 Hamilton, supra note 124, at 587-94.
13") See generally Richard E. Wagner, Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility: 'Progressive' Philanthropy vs. Traditional Charity, in
ALTERNATIVES IN PHILANTHROPY 1-4 (1993). See also ThomasJ.
DiLorenzo, The Corporate Responsibility Agenda, in ALTERNA-
TIVES IN PHILANTHROPY 4-5 (1993).
131 See Jonathan Rauch, The Hyperpluralism Trap, THE
rate contributions to both political action commit-
tees and to nonprofit public interest
organizations fund highly politicized agendas.'
32
Paradoxically, the same for-profit corporations
that have been increasingly excluded from an
overt political presence have been encouraged to
develop a covert presence through the funding of
politically active nonprofit corporations.
The agenda of these nonprofit corporations
often has little justification under a theory of fidu-
ciary trust. If, for example, a corporation contrib-
utes to a controversial organization such as
Planned Parenthood, management may invite a
consumer boycott of its products by those who op-
pose Planned Parenthood's agenda. This boycott
squanders resources that have no apparent bear-
ing on the corporation's economic mandate.
1 3 3
Almost any use of corporate money may be sup-
ported by some assertion of shareholder interest
in public relations, community involvement, or
simply societal improvement. Milton Friedman
has criticized this social engineering as an abuse
of corporate management's discretion. 1 34 Fried-
man has argued that, consistent with the classical
liberal ideals that informed the framers of the
U.S. Constitution, the workings of the market act
as an "invisible hand" producing good (or supply)
where there is need (or demand).' 35 Corporate
contributions to such nonprofit ideological cor-
porations ought to be judged, at a minimum, by
the same standard of fiduciary trust that this anal-
ysis proposes regarding contributions to candi-
dates.
NEW REPUBLIC, June 6, 1994, at 22-25. See also Demosclerosis,
NAT'LJ., Sept. 5, 1992, at 1998-2003.
132 See generally Stuart Nolan, Patterns of Corporate Philan-
thropy: Public Affairs Giving and the Forbes 250, CAPITAL RE-
SEARCH CENTER (1994).
133 See Douglas Scott, Bad Choices: A Look Inside Planned
Parenthood, LEGACY COMMUNICATIONS, 1992, at 233-48.
Surveys list Planned Parenthood, the nation's largest per-
former of abortions, among organizations that donors most
often direct the United Way to refrain from funding with
their particular contribution. See Vince Stehle, The Charities
Americans Like Most - and Least, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY,
Dec. 13, 1994, at 1, 12-14.
134 See Milton Friedman, Freedom and Philanthropy: An In-
terview with Milton Friedman, ALrERNATIVES IN PHILANTHROPY,
March, 1989, at 1-6. "I don't believe [corporations] should
be contributing at all, unless it's in their immediate, direct
pecuniary interest, except insofar as they're doing it at the
behest of their shareholders." ld. at 3-4.
135 See generally Jerry Z. Muller, ADAM SMITH IN HIS TIME
AND OURS: DESIGNING THE DECENT SOCIETY 86 (1993).
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D. Compelling Questions: Types of
Corporations and Exceeding the Fiduciary
Mandate
As this Comment has argued, First Amendment
rights apply to corporations as assemblies of indi-
viduals, and fiduciary duty should determine the
extent to which managers may engage in political
expression. Thus, the distinctions between for-
profit and nonprofit corporations bear closer ex
amination .3 6 If it follows that civil derivative ac-
tions should limit corporate political expression
beyond management's authority to speak on be-
half of shareholders, how should the Court deter-
mine whether management of a nonprofit corpo-
ration has exceeded the scope of its authority with
respect to political expression? 137
Under both commercial speech doctrine and
the model jurisprudence proposed by this analy-
sis, ideological expression should receive stronger
protection than mere commercial speech. When
the corporations are nonprofits formed explicitly
to pursue a political agenda, the purpose is all the
more important.1 38 Nonetheless, if for-profit cor-
porations must answer to shareholders, so must
the nonprofit, even if the shareholders are now
called members or donors. In either case, the
corporation exists as a voluntary association to
further the common purpose of individuals.
This analysis has now identified the nature of
rights as invested in individuals, the nature of cor-
porations as associations of individuals with first
amendment protection, the nature of fiduciary
trust as a limit on the authority of management to
"speak" on behalf of shareholders or members,
and the nature of nonprofit corporations as as-
sociations organized expressly for political advo-
cacy. But whereas the rationale under the pro-
posed model jurisprudence justifies political
expression by for-profits only to the extent that
the expression is reasonably linked to the com-
mercial purpose, nonprofit managers have no
such check on their authority. Regulation of non-
136 See Charles N. Eberhardt, INTEGRATING TIE RIGHT OF
ASSOCIATION WITH THE BELLO-I"I RIGHT TO HEAR: FEDERAL
ELECTION COMMISSION X'. MASSACHUSETTS CITIZENS FOR LIFE,
INC., 72 CORNELL L. REv. 159 (1986) (for distinctions be-
tween regulation of commercial speech derived from the
right to hear, and the First Amendment protection afforded
ideological corporations derived from the right to associa-
tion).
137 See generally, Alan J. Meese, Limitations on Corporate
Speech: Protection for Shareholders or Abridgment of Expression?, 2
profits via derivative action for breach of fiduciary
trust would probably prove impractical, but non-
profit corporations remain subject to tax code
regulations. Thus, questions regarding nonprofit
political expression necessarily involve the debate
regarding taxpayer-subsidized political expres-
sion. If corporations are vehicles for the expres-
sion of individual rights and if fiduciary duty lim-
its the authority under which managers function
with consent, then the Court's rulings concern-
ing "compelled speech" are dispositive.
The Court's "compelled speech" precedent ex-
plores First Amendment issues implicated by cor-
porate management's breach of fiduciary duty
since such a breach constitutes speech beyond the
authority and consent in a contractual mandate.
The proponents of increased regulation embrace
campaign finance regulation to promote "equal
access" to the marketplace of ideas, Yet, as this
Comment has noted, the Court's antitrust cases
suggest that corporate expression that "corrupts"
by merely denying "equal" access has not met the
required threshold for triggering a substantial
state interest. Actual corruption, rather than the
perception of such that fuels calls for campaign
finance regulation, occurs when the electoral pro-
cess is illegitimately impacted. Compelled speech,
such as that which occurs when corporate man-
agement's political agenda is unknown to or con-
trary to the wishes of that corporation's share-
holders, is a true corruption of political markets.
In the relativist world envisioned by would-be
speech regulators, everyone-statesman and
crackpot alike-is equally entitled to be heard at
the same muffled volume. But the First Amend-
ment protects individuals' right to speak (as well
as that of assemblies of individuals), not society's
right to hear. The regulatory approach implicitly
equates each idea and each candidate with any
other. Such mandates fail to recognize varying in-
dividual merit and desire. Simply put, some ideas
are better than others, and some candidates are
WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 305 (1993) (arguing that sweep-
ing restrictions on corporate political expression violate
shareholders' rights).
138 See generally Victor Brudney, Association, Advocacy, and
the First Amendment, 4 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1 (1995).
Professor Brudney distinguishes between the protection af-
forded multi-purpose vs. exclusively expressive associations.
See id. at 88. Expression rights of the latter are "presump-
tively entitled" to at least as much protection as that ex-
tended to individuals. See id. at 79.
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better than others as vehicles for those ideas. The
need to raise money and to win the support of vol-
unteers helps identify the candidates who can ar-
ticulate a coherent message that will resonate with
the public'.
E. Deregulating the Marketplace of Ideas
In short, the marketplace of ideas is not so dif-
ferent from the marketplace for material goods
and services. However, the government's author-
ity to regulate the latter in no way endows it with
authority to restrict the former. Ironically, the
Cold War's aftermath has witnessed an America
increasingly skeptical of the federal government's
authority to regulate economic markets yet in-
creasingly willing to entertain regulation of polit-
ical markets. As consumers, Americans accept the
use of money as a valid measurement of supply
and demand in the distribution of material goods
and services. As citizens, however, Americans dis-
trust the role of money as a similar measure of
support for political candidates and platforms.
Yet, although the Commerce Clause permits fed-
eral intervention in interstate economics, the First
Amendment specifically limits government's au-
thority to regulate electoral markets. Even with-
out the First Amendment, however, the federalists
argued that the enumerated nature of the federal
government's powers inherently limited its
reach? 39 In fact, they considered a specific list of
limits on the government's authority an unneces-
sary and potentially dangerous measure.
1 40
Even if government had the sweeping authority
it claims to regulate political markets, it would re-
main an ill-advised policy. Regulating the market-
place of ideas produces equality for some only by
limiting the freedom of others. Under the most
basic theories of comparative advantage and plu-
ralism, society is served best when each individual
chooses to participate and contribute in the man-
ner for which he or she is well-suited relative to
the demand for that particular form of participa-
tion. All persons do not run for office or even fol-
139 See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 325-338
(1997).
140 See id. The federalists warned that a Bill of Rights
which specified limits could serve instead as a mere rhetori-
cal hurdle if the perception developed that these limits were
the only exceptions to government power. See id.
141 See Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of
Fund-Raising: Wy Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the
low politics particularly closely. Some run for of-
fice, some build products, and others offer
services. Financial contributions by citizens who
do not have the time or inclination to become
full-time champions of ideas must necessarily be
channeled to those who have both. Such contri-
butions intrinsically communicate political sup-
port.
The case law recognizes that an individual may
choose to "speak" either by running for office or
by contributing money to a candidate. Thus, the
Court has expressly forbid spending limits on in-
dividuals who run for office. However, the Court
has also attempted to distinguish candidate
spending from individual and corporate contribu-
tions. Congress may limit monetary contributions
to a campaign, but it may only offer "public fi-
nancing" subsidies to "encourage" candidates to
accept "voluntary" limits on spending. As a result,
the independently wealthy may run for office
without devoting substantial periods of time to
fundraising, but other candidates must constantly
identify ever-increasing numbers of contributors
to raise the money necessary to get their message
out. Contribution limits, then, produce a per-
verse effect by requiring candidates to spend
more time raising money.' 4 ' Every contribution
becomes critical, and every contributor exerts dis-
proportionate influence.
In the end, the Buckley court failed to reconcile
its defense of expression via money spent with ex-
pression via money contributed to another more
equipped or more willing to directly communi-
cate the idea in question. The First Amendment,
as interpreted by the Buckley court, would only
protect the expression rights of individuals who
run for elective office, a meaning that it simply
will not bear. As implied by Citizens Against Rent
Control and C-PAC, the recognition of expenditure
limits as unconstitutional is the best evidence that
contributions limits must also be struck down by
the Court or repealed by Congress. True reform
must recognize the truth denied in Buckley.142 A
contribution to one is the expenditure of an-
First Amendment After All, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1281 (1994).
Vincent Professor Blasi defends regulation as a means to
limit the ways candidates spend their time. See id. at 1282.
142 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 59, 60. The Court distin-
guished between contributions limits (which it upheld) and
limits on independent expenditures, overall spending by the
candidate, and the use of personal and family funds (which it
struck down). See id.
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other. The Supreme Court's distinction between
contributions and expenditures is invalid, and de-
regulation would eliminate that distinction.
Deregulation would introduce more competi-
tion and reintroduce accountability to political
discourse.14" Deregulatory reform should elimi-
nate contribution limits, making it easier for can-
didates to replace any single contributor with an-
other. 144 This is the only reform that will truly
diminish the role of money, even if the actual
amount of spending increases. Unrestricted polit-
ical debate, after all, informs the citizenry and em-
powers the voters.145 Free of excessive and unau-
thorized regulation, the citizenry will support
their favored candidates with their money, their
time, and their votes.
F. Empowering Shareholders: Limited
Disclosure Requirements, Contract
Enforcement, and Competition by the States
Finally, this Comment explores limited disclo-
sure requirements, contract enforcement, and
state competition for business incorporation as le-
gitimate means for empowering shareholders and
protecting political markets from the actual cor-
ruption that compelled speech produces. Disclo-
sure requirements may be appropriate under spe-
cific circumstances. Any disclosure requirement,
however, should be linked to a fiduciary duty.
The valid purpose of the requirement (preven-
tion of compelled speech) does not extend to the
public at large, and as the Court has suggested,
widespread disclosure produces a chilling effect.
The Harriss Court went too far by construing
the First Amendment to allow broad public disclo-
sure requirements. The Court based its decision
on fear that "the voice of the people may all too
easily be drowned out by the voice of special inter-
est groups seeking favored treatment while mas-
querading as proponents of the public weal".
146
143 See generally Peter H. Schuck, Against (And For)
Madison: An Essay in Praise of Factions, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
553 (1997).
144 See Wilbur C. Leatherberry, Rethinking Regulation of In-
dependent Expenditures by PACs, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 13
(1985).
145 See Robert S. Peck, Free Speech and Political Reform, 21
OKLA. Crrv U. L. REv. 53 (1996).
146 Harriss, 347 U.S. at 625. The Court failed to explain
the distinction (undoubtedly because there is none) between
a "special interest group" and a voluntary association of indi-
viduals with the right to "free speech" and to petition the gov-
Instead of preserving integrity in the political pro-
cess, however, the Harriss court encouraged law-
yers and lobbyists to develop more sophisticated
forms with which to engage in pressure politics.
147
True reform should recognize management's
fiduciary duty and promote accountability by
compelling executives to disclose to members or
shareholders the identity of each recipient and
the amount of every contribution to political can-
didates, parties, or nonprofit advocacy groups. As
individuals with a right to know how their money
is being invested, shareholders and members
would be free to publicize inappropriate support.
Limited disclosure requirements would only
"chill" expression to the extent that corporate
management feels restrained by its contractual
mandate and fiduciary duty. State-initiated re-
quirements would make corporate management
more responsive to shareholders or members, and
information could filter to the wider public
through disgruntled shareholders if corporate
management's political agenda overreached.
State regulation of the corporate form (via char-
ter) may even offer varying degrees of share-
holder protection, fostering competition for the
incorporation of businesses.
IV. CONCLUSION
Alexis de Tocqueville noted that America de-
rived great strength from the rights of voluntary
association, petition, and political speech, 4 but
those who honor the heritage of a free people
must view with alarm recent developments in the
debate over "campaign finance reform," as well as
the failings of the current jurisprudence gov-
erning political debate. Ultimately, any resolu-
tion in the campaign finance debate must recon-
cile legitimate political expression under the First
Amendment and the undue influence that has
undermined public confidence in the political sys-
ernment. Id.
147 These include ideological "think tanks", political ac-
tion committees, nonpartisan "grass-roots" education and ad-
vocacy groups, endowed foundations, and eventually, the
"public interest" litigation groups, all taking the nonprofit
corporate form. See generally Laura Chisolm, Sinking the Think
Tanks Upstream: The Use and Misuse of Tax Exemption Law to
Address the Use and Misuse of Tax-Exempt Organizations by Politi-
cians, 51 U. Prrr. L. REv. 577 (1990).
148 See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
96 (Richard D. Heffner, ed. 1956).
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tem through the incompetence, corruption, or
overreach of corporate managers. The proposed
model for First Amendment jurisprudence ad-
dresses crucial distinctions between the individual
and the corporation as a source of rights, as well
as between the for-profit and nonprofit corpora-
tion as a source of management's responsibility
and as a potential for compelled speech. This
Comment, then, concludes that a model corpo-
rate political expression jurisprudence must rec-
ognize that:
*distinctions between contributions and ex-
penditures are invalid;
*the federal government has no authority to
regulate political markets and is specifically
banned from "infringing" on political expression
by private actors under the First Amendment;
Ocorporations are associations of individuals
peacefully assembled for distinct purposes, as set
out in their charters;
Omanagement's corporate political expression
on shareholders' behalf should be limited only by
management's fiduciary duty;
*government's proper authority in the enforce-
ment of contracts remains sufficient to guard
against compelled speech, a true corruption of
the political process; and
*although disclosure requirements may build
public confidence in the integrity of the political
system and are vastly preferable to the current sys-
tem of prior restraint (via contribution and ex-
penditure regulation), limitations on federal reg-
ulatory authority and the potential "chilling"
effects of such disclosure requirements mean that
such rules should be devised by the states and that
disclosure should be directed only to the party to
whom a fiduciary duty is owed.
This analysis has examined the legal and policy
issues connected to the recent scandals in light of
Supreme Court precedent and attempts at cam-
paign finance "reform" and has proposed a corpo-
rate political expression jurisprudence model
consistent with those traditional American values
encompassed in the phrase "free speech". A legal
theory that recognizes corporations as catalysts for
individuals' collective expression while penalizing
managers who exceed their contractual mandate
will best preserve our First Amendment freedoms
and simultaneously promote public confidence in
the integrity of the political system.
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